Justice Antonin Scalia’s death impacts Indian country in dramatic ways. Last term,
the most critical tribal court jurisdiction appeal to hit the
Supreme Court of the United States in decades was affirmed by a 4-4 tie in favor of tribal jurisdiction. The court declined certiorari in
a pair of tribal labor relations cases where
there was a gaping circuit split, possibly because the justices foresaw
yet another 4-4 tie. The next justice may be the deciding vote in cases
that bring the same questions, but
bigger cases involving the Indian Child Welfare Act(ICWA) are in the pipeline.
ICWA is invoked in literally
hundreds of child welfare cases throughout
the country every year. ICWA applies whenever an Indian child is
removed from home by state agencies, and further applies when an Indian
parent’s rights to a child might be terminated. ICWA requires state
courts with jurisdiction over Indian children to notify relevant tribes
and allow them to intervene as a party, and in some matters transfer
jurisdiction to tribal court. ICWA more quietly establishes robust due
process protections for Indian parents and Indian children, protections
that Casey Family Programs and 16 other child welfare advocacy groups
call the
“gold standard” in child welfare statutes. Given that many
state child welfare systems are bureaucratic nightmares where families can be lost, this is an important statement.
On rare occasions, only twice, the
Supreme Court has addressed narrow questions of statutory interpretation
in the weeds of ICWA’s text. In both instances, Justice Scalia voted in
favor of tribal interests under ICWA, but later stated publicly he
didn’t like it. Since ICWA’s enactment in 1978, some state court judges
and agencies have been saying the same thing. Because certain provisions
of ICWA also apply to a
“voluntary proceeding[s],” (read:
private market adoption), the most strident opponent to ICWA’s
enactment then and now is the private adoption industry, a
$14 billion market. Groups
that represent that market have been trying to serve up a vehicle for
Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of some or all of ICWA.
And by “vehicle,” I mean an Indian child with Indian parents, likely
going through the roughest period of their lives. Congress enacted ICWA
because it found that 25-35 percent of all Indian children had been
removed from their homes and almost always placed by state workers as
far from their Indian family members as possible. All of that without
due process. Nearly four decades later, states are still removing Indian
children and placing them in state foster care at wildly
disproportionate rates. But
now Indian tribes are intervening under ICWA whenever they can,
offering services and doing their best to keep the state agencies
honest.
How does an Indian child welfare matter become appellate litigation
that could be teed up for Supreme Court review? In the two prior
instances the court addressed ICWA, the party opposing the application
of ICWA simply refused to comply with ICWA, and dared an appellate court
to stop them. In the first case,
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, decided way back in 1989 by a 6-3 vote, private adoption
counsel persuaded a young Indian couple that was pregnant to move off
the reservation to have their children (twins) and let a non-Indian
couple adopt the kids through state court processes. The Mississippi
courts, ignoring their own law on domicile, allowed the adoption. The
Supreme Court reversed, and ordered the case transferred to tribal
court. By that time, years had passed with the children in the
non-Indian home. The tribe and the tribal court welcomed the children
home but still ratified the adoption with the non-Indian family. Justice
Scalia voted in favor of the tribe, though he said later in interviews
that it was one of his most difficult votes.
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In the second Supreme Court case,
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
decided 5-4, private adoption counsel improperly spelled the Indian
father’s name wrong and provided the wrong birth date when notifying the
tribe. That kept the tribe out of the early stages of the adoption.
They kept the father out, too, by not serving him in a timely manner.
The father was an active duty serviceman about to be deployed to a war
zone when adoption counsel finally served him with the adoption papers.
His deployment stalled everything for about a year, but during that time
Baby Girl V. was living with the non-Indian couple and not her
relatives, who would have gladly taken her. By the time the South
Carolina Supreme Court decided in favor of the Indian father, Baby Girl
V. was two years old. The adoptive couple then used a powerful media
strategy to attack ICWA and the Indian father. The Supreme Court took
the case and reversed on a technical interpretation of ICWA. Justice
Scalia dissented on the simple ground that there was a fit father who
wanted his child home with him, and who had her home with him for two
years before he was forced to give her back to the adoptive couple.
Sadly, Baby Girl’s most critical precedent might have been to
unintentionally endorse the borderline unethical tactics of adoption
counsel. That included stalling instead of returning Indian children to
their families and violating the privacy rights of Indian families by
pasting their images and names on social media and everywhere else.
By now, the private adoption industry’s playbook on attacking the
application of ICWA is clear. Match an Indian child with a non-Indian
foster or adoptive family. Persuade the foster family to renounce the
goal of reunification of the Indian family and seek adoption instead.
Use the media to incite racial hostility toward Indian people in the
media. Then go to court, claim that ICWA is preventing the foster family
from adopting the Indian child and litigate, litigate, litigate.
That’s what happened, and may still be happening
in the matter of Alexandria P. Lexi,
an Oklahoma Choctaw child living in California who was removed from her
parents and placed with a local foster family while efforts to reunify
the family were ongoing. Non-Indian relatives living in Utah began
preparations to bring Lexi into their home in case reunification failed,
visiting her regularly at her foster home. Reunification failed after a
year or so. The trial court conducted a best interest of the child
hearing and concluded Lexi should go with her Utah relatives. This
conformed to the wishes and recommendations of Lexi’s attorney, the
state of California and the
Choctaw Nation of
Oklahoma. By then, the foster couple had shifted into an adversarial
mode against Lexi’s relatives, and wanted to keep Lexi. Private adoption
counsel advised the foster couple to appeal, and then appeal again, and
then appeal again. All these appeals stalled the return of Lexi to her
relatives for
three years. There were three best interests of
the child hearings favoring Lexi’s return to her relatives followed by
appeals. And when the appellate court finally confirmed the placement
order after the third appeal, the foster family generated the media
firestorm that is now a critical part of the private adoption industry’s
anti-ICWA playbook, putting a little girl under a national microscope
that violated her right to privacy and turned public opinion against the
good people who had Lexi’s best interests at heart.
Lexi is back with her relatives, which is what should happen whenever
there are fit relatives, under state law or ICWA. Perhaps not wanting
all the media attention to go to waste, adoption counsel is still
seeking appellate review, now from the California Supreme Court. Counsel
is still pointing at ICWA as the problem. But Lexi is not a good
“vehicle” for attacking ICWA’s constitutionality. State law would have
justified Lexi’s return to her relatives. And three times the trial
court, with three different judges, confirmed that it was in her best
interests to return to her relatives. Surely the California Supreme
Court will see through the smoke and mirrors.
Even as Indian children like Lexi are identified by the private adoption industry as vehicles to challenge ICWA, the
U.S. Department of the Interior recently promulgated formal
ICWA regulations that
will be live in December 2016. They resolve some ambiguities in the
statute that the private adoption industry has exploited for years, and
so there will surely be challenges to those regulations as well.
All of this means that the Supreme Court may be peppered with
certiorari petitions involving challenges to ICWA in the coming years.
There is a clear divide on the court right now, with Justice Elena Kagan
offering a pragmatic view of federal Indian law that takes into account
the history of tribal-federal-state relations, and more conservative
justices expressing skepticism. In Indian affairs cases that test the
constitutionality of statutes rather than their interpretation, the rest
of the court tends to side with the now-standard ideological splits
seen in other areas, such as affirmative action and abortion. But ICWA
can excite passions, and perhaps may unsettle the regular split.
The next justice likely will have to sift through zealous, emotional
attacks on ICWA, Indian tribes and Indian people. Justice Scalia was
able to do that in the Holyfield and Baby Girl cases, and voted in line
with the statutory text. In any event, the next justice may be the fifth
vote in how ICWA will be interpreted, or if it will even survive.
—By Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Michigan State University College of Law
Matthew L.M. Fletcher is
a professor of law at Michigan State University College of
Law. Fletcher is the primary editor and author of the leading law blog
on American Indian law and policy, Turtle Talk.
The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the firm, its clients, or Portfolio
Media Inc., or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article
is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should
not be taken as legal advice.